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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
succeeded in the job he has set for himself and has given a fair impression of
the manner in which the Justice has executed his public duties.
JOHN P. FRANK*-
THE CASE OF GENERAL YAMASHITA. By A. Frank Reel. Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1949. Pp. 324.
Hurriedly picked from various army commands in the Philippines at the
end of the war, six American lawyers were assigned the task of defending
the Japanese general, Yamashita, who, as commander of Japanese forces in
the Philippines from October 9, 1944, to the surrender on September 3, 1945,
was charged by the American Government with responsibility for the war
crimes committed by his troops. At no time in a position to offer coordinated
resistance to the American Army, which began its relentless return to the
Islands with the landings on Leyte on October 18, 1944, the Japanese forces
had succumbed to an orgy of murder, destruction, pillage, and rape. Unlike
the atrocities at the time of the surrender on Bataan, which were committed
against American prisoners of war, these later acts were committed for the
most part against Philippine civilians. The only extenuating circumstance
was the problem which guerrilla warfare posed for the Japanese-a factor,
however, which was not involved in Manila where the wanton behavior of the
Japanese forces was particularly shocking.
Yamashita was served with the charge on September 25, 1945, and was ar-
raigned on October 8. On October 29, the trial began and on December 7,
the anniversary of Pearl Harbor, the sentence of death was pronounced. The
author of this present volume, viewing the trial from the standpoint of the
defense counsel of which he was a member, makes the reader cognizant of
the impatient haste with which the Military Commission conducted the trial
and also of the pressure which the Commission itself was under fi-om General
MacArthur's headquarters. From the point of view of the military authorities
speed seemed to accentuate the justice of a result which they anticipated with
certainty; but from the point of view of the defense counsel, all but one of
whom were civilian lawyers in uniform, it seemed to be a gross violation of
even the minimum requirements of due process-a fault which for them was
compounded by their belief that the charge itself failed to define a war crime
and that Yamashita was in fact innocent.
The prodigious labors of defense counsel, which the author relates with
a nice appreciation of the human drama involved, did not arise out of mere
professional zeal. Nor did they arise out of fondness for Yamashita, al-
though the author was obviously attracted by his personality and persuaded
* Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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as to his good character. The extraordinary energy and devotion displayed
by the defense arose primarily out of their inability to give any credence
to the idea that Yamashita was actually responsible. He was not charged
with having ordered the atrocities. The logic of the charge was that his
position of command was sufficient in itself to incur responsibility for acts
of subordinates; no evidence was adduced that the acts were either ordered or
condoned-although the inference was that atrocities on such a wide scale
could not have occured without the knowledge of Yamashita's headquarters.
Mr. Reel is personally convinced that Yamashita, who was new to his com-
mand, never had a chance amidst the confusion created by the overwhelming
power of the American assault to establish any effective control over his
forces, which included air and naval contingents freshly assimilated to army
command. The crimes in Manila were perpetrated by Japanese marines who,
either through confusion or insubordination, had failed to evacuate the city
according to Yamashita's orders.
The case It re Yamashita,' decided by the United States Supreme
Court on February 4, 1946, was unprecedented in a number of its aspects, but
most notably in that this was the first instance in which an enemy general had
been held responsible by the United States for action (or inaction) connected
with hostilities. The novelty was not lessened by the fact that the accused
(by virtue of the diligence of defense counsel) appealed to the civilian courts
against jurisdiction claimed and exercised by the American Army. Had war-
fare still been in active progress the Supreme Court might not have seen its
way to admitting the case to a hearing. However, the fact of the Armistice
deprived the case of the element of military urgency which is the essential
basis for the large autonomy enjoyed by military courts. Nevertheless, having
received the appeal, the Court, in an opinion subscribed to by six judges,
upheld the jurisdiction of the Military Commission. Both majority and
minority opinions made clear that the substance of the case was subject to re-
view only by higher military authority and ultimately by the President, the
question of guilt or innocence being outside the purview of the civilian courts.
Yamashita was hanged on February 23, 1946.
In strongly felt and vigorously uttered dissents, Justices Murphy and
Rutledge denied the jurisdiction of the Commission. Both agreed, although
it was left to Justice Murphy to emphasize, that the charge was defective in
failing to accuse Yamashita of any recognized war crime. They rejected
the theory of command responsibility as repugnant to American legal concepts
1. 327 U. S. 1 (1946).
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and as being without foundation in international law. 2 Justice Rutledge ex-
plored the still more interesting question of the bearing of the 5th Amendment.
Whereas the majority had found the Articles of War and the Geneva Con-
vention of 1929 to be inapplicable to an enemy combatant, it was Rutledge's
view not only that these instruments did not exclude Yamashita, but that the
5th Amendment was in any event applicable. Since the order establishing the
Commission sanctioned the admittance of evidence which fell far short of
the safeguards erected by the common law, Rutledge was prepared to find,
on that basis alone, that the Commission did not have lawful control of the
defendant and that the writ of habeas corpus should issue.
The eloquence of the dissents, whose authors have now been lost to
the Court through untimely death, deserves special comment. Included within
their scope is judgment on the effect of the summary character of Yamashita's
trial on the pacification of the defeated enemys and on the integrity of Amer-
ican standards of justice. It is this latter consideration which moves Justice
Rutledge to a painstaking formulation of his position. Although the case is
on the periphery of civilian jurisdiction in hitherto untrod territory, Rutledge
finds no convincing basis on which to give the Military Commission free reign.
In the circumstances, not of battle but of the enemy's acknowledged defeat,
the Constitution, Rutledge contends, follows the flag, guarantees to an enemy
2. Mr. Justice Murphy stated:
Duties, as well as ability to control troops, vary according to the
nature and intensity of the particular battle. To find an unlawful
deviation from duty under battle conditions requires difficult and
speculative calculations. Such calculations become highly untrust-
worthy when they are made by the victor in relation to the actions of
a vanquished commander. Objective and realistic norms of conduct are
then extremely unlikely to be used in forming a judgment as to devia-
tions from duty. The probability that vengeance will form the major
part of the victor's judgment is an unfortunate but inescapable fact.
So great is that probability that international law refuses to recognize
such a judgment as a basis for a war crime, however fair the judgment
may be in a particular instance. It is this consideration that under-
mines the charge against the petitioner in this case. 327 U. S. 1, 35
(1946).
3. Mr. Justice Murphy stated:
But in the sober afterglow will come the realization of the boundless
and dangerous implications of the procedure sanctioned today. No one
in a position of command in an army, from sergeant to general, can
escape those implications. . . . But even more significant will be the
hatred and ill-will growing out of the application of this unprecedented
procedure. That has been the inevitable effect of every method of
punishment disregarding the element of personal culpability. The effect
in this instance, unfortunately, will be magnified infinitely, for here we
are dealing with the rights of man on an international level. To subject
an enemy belligerent to an unfair trial, to charge him with an un-
recognized crime, or to vent on him our retributive emotions only
antagonizes the enemy nation and hinders the reconciliation necessary
to a peaceful world. 327 U. S. 1, 28 (1946).
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belligerent the benefits of due process, and requires that the civilian courts
strictly confine the jurisdiction of the military to what will withstand critical
scrutiny.
Mr. Reel is notably successful in combining the dramatic aspects of his
story with the technicalities of the law, which enhances the value of the book
for educating the public to that little known area of law in which civilian
and military jurisdictions impinge on each other. Moreover, this account
of Yamashita's case is a new reminder of the very human and violently
emotional situations which have given rise to the safeguards which normally
hedge in our criminal procedure. The reader is persuaded that Yamashita
paid for crimes for which he was not personally responsible and which, if
circumstances had permitted, he might have tried to suppress. The book does
not help to explain what seems to be a consistent pattern of gratuitous cruelty
indulged in by Japanese forces against civilians and prisoners of war. Neither
the prosecution nor the defense in Yamashita's case throws light on this
interesting question, which, perhaps, can be answered only through a close
acquaintance with Japanese culture and history. The answer to this problem
is not likely to be one of a nature which permits the fixing of responsibility
for Japanese war crimes in accordance with the recognized categories of
the law.
The reviewer is greatly impressed with the conscientious, skillful, and
energetic defense which Yamashita's counsel afforded to a fallen foe. These
lawyers, who were chosen quite at random, overcame tremendous obstacles
at almost every step, eventually carrying their case to the Supreme Court
and then on to the White House. As a layman, the reviewer can say in
good grace that this remarkable record is not without significance as an
index to the health of the American legal profession.
EDWARD H. BUEIIRIGt
PUBLIC ORGANIZATION OF ELECTRIC POWER, by John Bauer and Peter
Costello. New York: Harper & Brothers. Pp. 263.
Public Organization of Electric Power, by John Bauer and his associate,
Peter Costello, presents the most effective analysis of the case for public
ownership and operation of the electric power industry that has appeared.
Dr. Bauer has devoted most of his life to the cause of effective regulation
and he concludes with reluctance that regulation can never accomplish the na-
tional organization of the industry, the reduction in costs, and the universal
availability of this basic and essential service which the public requires. "I
should prefer continuance of private ownership under public control if this
t Professor of Government, Indiana University.
